\r\n
\r\n
ENERGY PERFORMANCE \r\n CONTRACT MODELS \r\n |
\r\n
CONTRAC TYPE | FIRST IN | ||
SCHEME OF THE CONTRACT | \r\n
\r\n source: ASSISTAL \r\n |
||
GENERAL INFORMATION | CUSTOMER | \r\n
─ The customer pays a fixed fee that guarantees a guaranteed minimum saving of energy costs historical. \r\n ─ If the saving is major of the minimum fixed the customer have a positive adjustment at year end \r\n |
|
ESCO | \r\n
─ ESCO finances interventions with equity capital or through third Party Financing (“credit risk”) \r\n ─ The ESCO makes the interventions of energy savings and governs installations, of which will maintain the property until the end of the contract (technical risk) \r\n ─ ESCO it is for to 100% of the expected savings in contract; if the saving is major, the difference is shared with the customer \r\n |
||
BANK | ─ The Bank finances the ESCO if not use the equity | ||
SWOT ANALYSIS | STRENGTHS | \r\n
─ Immediate return for the Public Administration in terms of savings on energy bills even if not higher. \r\n ─ A minimum amount of savings is also guaranteed by the contract with the ESCO who assumes the financial and technical risk of the operations; additional savings beyond those guaranteed to the customer are recognized to the customer \r\n |
|
WEAKNESSES | \r\n
─ Type of contract too biased in favor of the Public Administration, so unattractive to the ESCOs \r\n ─ The relatively long duration is a problem both for the public and private sector \r\n |
||
OPPORTUNITY | ─ Guaranteed savings and immediate on energy bill, and any residues savings in favor of the customer (public). | ||
THREATS | \r\n
─ Little incentive to ESCOs to improve results (additional savings remain customer) \r\n ─ Volatility of the energy market \r\n ─ Difficult access to incentives and fundings for ESCO \r\n |
||
LEARN MORE | http://iet.jrc.ec.europa.eu/energyefficiency/european-energy-service-companies/energy-performance-contracting |